The trouble with those quislings which Professor Clive Hamilton refers to in his book Silent Invasion as ‘Friends of China’ and alert Australians is that both only conceive of ‘systems’.
We speak, of course, from a mainstream perspective, or at any rate, in the mainstream theatre. Nationalists and others who oppose the Sinophication of Australia are on the fringes of Australian political life. We refer to the persons of influence, the ones who act in a government, business, or advocate capacity, and whose decisions in political life control our fortunes as Australians.
In the closing part of Professor Hamilton’s book, he describes various categories of those advancing Australia’s course toward China as a client state. He writes of ‘The China Club’, a ‘cohort of advisers in the Hawke-Keating era that would go on to dominate the central agencies of government for the next two decades, setting the agenda and nurturing the generation that followed’. Next up are the ‘Innocents’, then the ‘Realists’, followed by the ‘Capitulationists’, ‘The Pragmatists’, ‘Dear Friends’, and finally, ‘Australians against Democracy’.
In all of these capacities, the people mentioned and those like them are intentionally or inadvertently promoting the PRC’s agenda. There are those on the payroll, those suffering ‘Relevance Deprivation Syndrome’ who Beijing flatters and in return they sing Beijing’s praises; those who are convinced by arguments of our economic dependence on China; those who see America as a waning power and believe we must now accept dominion status from China; and those too paralysed by ‘xenophobia-phobia’ to react in any meaningful capacity.
Of these categories, the last is the most interesting; those who regard democratic and human rights — values we’ve long been told are Australian values, as well as being the ‘western values’ communist Chinese ridicule — with indifference.
Hamilton describes them as typically arguing that these pivotal ideals, which include freedom of speech, cannot be pressed upon China because they are not Chinese values. In fact, they are not really talking about a system at all, they are whether they realise it or not attributing the absence of such standards as a condition of being Chinese (which dismisses those Chinese opposed to the totalitarianism of the Leninist state) which goes beyond a governing system transcending into an essence of racial consciousness.
By this mechanism, they negate dissenting opinion regarding China’s unnatural influence by disregarding it as ‘racism’.
It’s amusing that an argument which was made by former Prime Minister Paul Keating, a true panda-hugger, sounded like something agreed by those from allied countries who respected Adolf Hitler for economically rescuing Germany in the 1930s. He told an audience that even though ‘we’ don’t endorse human rights abuses, the communist Chinese government nonetheless had an onerous job of lifting 600 million Chinese out of poverty. This is an accepted trope. But as Hamilton pointed out, they only did that after first taking their boot off the throat of the Chinese people.
We are not about to argue whether or not authoritarianism is the natural state of the Chinese race, and we don’t care. What’s telling is how quickly those like Keating make concessions to China regarding ultra-nationalistic and hegemonic principles while condemning the more innocent and advantageous desire of many Australians to return to an Anglo-Celtic-European ‘white working man’s paradise’. Or at least, to finally achieve it. They abhor us nationalists on the basis it conflicts with the values of a system which they’re only too willing to compromise for the sake of ‘economic benefits’ from a monster like China.
Thus, even the good guys in Hamilton’s book, those who we respect for understanding the game being played in our dealings with communist China and its inevitable perils, see only one system volleying with another. We would prefer to have a ‘people’ over a system and then that system can only be nationalism, but in our own Australian style; not in the jackboots and uniforms of historical foreign regimes which don’t sit with the anti-authoritarian Aussie spirit.
And on go those fools: either it is us ‘with the United States’ or ‘with China’ in order for them to determine our interests. We run the risk thereby of this quisling class enjoying the privileges of China’s protection while the rest of us are reduced to a pathetic, servile state. Bear in mind, this is true too in the capitalist ‘system’, where inch-by-inch Australians, deprived of manufacturing industry, with so much foreign ownership, and the competition created by unsustainable immigration, the lucky country has been lost and with it the great Australian dream. Long has capitalism trampled on ‘human rights’ and steamrolled over a ‘free press’ and all the other elements which Hamilton’s kind believe up-front (with all due respect to him).
In the thinking of those categories Hamilton highlights, we can only ever be satellites and must always have a protector: and yet, as Hamilton argues, Australia’s economy is almost as big as that of Russia and still we consider ourselves as a lightweight and not a middleweight nation.
When the argument is made whether or not to continue support for the United States or switch to being China’s shadow, all the considerations are in the interests of a social-economic system, not a people. Consider too that Hamilton winds up admitting those friendly Chinese he knows, in their estimations, believe that if a conflict arose between Australia, the US and China, even if they’re not overtly patriotic the diaspora would mostly side with China. Maybe then there is a racial dimension to the Chinese when it comes to their patriotism.
Yet, when we speak of Australians in the context of Australia as an economy, we cannot do the same while wearing the yoke of multiracialism because if we die we would be doing so, not just for a ‘system’, but one which true Australians, those whose patriotism goes beyond the blessed economy, despise.